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The Attorney- Corporate
Client Privilege
A Symposium

Fundamentals of the AttorneyClient Privilege
by A. KENNETH PYE, Dean, Duke University School of Law
T will be the function of the introductory portion of this symposium
to survey briefly the history and purpose of the attorney-client privilege, with special reference to its availability to corporations. It will summarize some of the existing authorities on this subject to provide a backdrop for the more practical insights into -the current problems provided
EDITOR'S NOTE: This article is based on a symposium that appeared in the April
of THE RECORD OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK.
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by the two sections that follow.
Dean Wigmore has tersely summarized the essential requirements
for the attorney-client privilege:
"(1) Where legal advice of any
kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity
as such, (3) the communications
relating to that purpose, (4) made
in confidence (5) by the client, (6)
are at his instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, (8) except the protection be waived."
8 J. WGMORE, EVIDENCE §2292 (Little, Brown & Co., Boston, Mass.,
McNaughton rev. 1961).
A more elaborate and somewhat
different formulation is found in
United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357 (D.
Mass. 1950).
HISTORY

The attorney-client privilege
seems first to have been recognized
in the 16th century.
Originally, the privilege seemed
to be based upon the honor of
the attorney and belonged to the
attorney, who could waive it. During the 18th century, the courts
found a new rationale in protecting the client from apprehension
that his confidences might be betrayed. By the middle of the 19th
century it was recognized that the
privilege belonged to the client.
At first it existed only when a
confidence had been communicated
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to a lawyer during litigation. Ultimately it extended to any consultation for legal advice.
The purpose of the privilege is
expressed well in a comment to the
Model Code of Evidence:
"In a society as complicated in
structure as ours and governed by
laws as complex and detailed as
those imposed upon us, expert legal
advice is essential. To the furnishing of such advice the fullest freedom and honesty of communication of pertinent facts is a prerequisite. To induce clients to make
such communication, the privilege
to prevent their later disclosure is
said by courts and commentators to
be a necessity. The social good derived from the proper performance
of the functions of lawyers acting
for their clients is believed to outweigh the harm that may come
from the suppression of the evidence in specific cases." ALI, MODEL
CODE OF EVIDENCE, Rule 210, Comment a (1942).
The privilege has undergone periodic attack by academicians of repute-Bentham, Morgan, McCormick, and Radin, to name a few.
But the bar and the bench have
been consistently alert to any attempt to narrow its scope.
APPLICABILITY TO CORPORATIONS

Prior to 1962 there was no case
that denied the availability of the
privilege to a corporation if the
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requirements of the privilege were
met. An impressive line of cases
assumed that a corporation could
assert the privilege.
The American Law Institute's
MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE

[Rule 209]

and the Uniform Rules of Evidence
[Rule 26(3)] included corporations
in the definition of clients who
could assert the privilege.
Radiant Burners Cases
Hence, two decisions by Chief
Judge Campbell of the Northern
District of Illinois, which denied
the availability of the privilege to
a corporation in the Radiant Burners cases, came as a considerable
shock to most lawyers who thought
the matter was free from doubt.
Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American
Gas Ass'n, 207 F. Supp. 771 (N.D.
Ill. 1962), 209 F. Supp. 321 (N.D.
Ill. 1962).
Chief Judge Campbell reasoned
that:
* Historically the attorney-client
privilege, like the privilege against
self-incrimination, was intended to
be available only to natural persons;
* The essential requirement of confidentiality could not exist within
a corporation, which necessarily
must operate through agents; and
e The visitatorial powers of the state
weaken the bases for the assertion
of the privilege by a corporation.
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Reversal
There followed a brief period of
considerable consternation, highlighted by a number of highly critical comments in the law reviews.
The furor subsided, however, when
the Seventh Circuit reversed Radiant Burners [320 F. 2d 314 (1963)].
The opinion made clear what
most observers has assumed previously-that, unlike the privilege
against self-incrimination, the attorney-client privilege does not exist
out of deference to a personal right,
but as a rule to facilitate the working of justice. Specifically, the
Court held:
"A corporation is entitled to the
same treatment as any other 'client'
-no more and no less. If it seeks
legal advice from an attorney, and
in that relationship confidentially
'communicates information relating
the advice sought, it may protect
itself from disclosure, absent its
waiver hereof." Id. at 324.
There seems little chance that
Chief Judge Campbell's views will
experience a renaissance. However,
Radiant Burners has had a profound influence on the attitude of
courts towards the assertion of the
privilege. The reasons suggested by
Judge Campbell as a basis for his
conclusion that the privilege is
never available to a corporation
have been utilized by other courts
to test the assertion of the privilege
in particular cases.
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There seems to be a clear recognition that the difference between
a corporation and a natural person
affects whether in a given case a
communication can be appropriately characterized as that of a corporation rather than its agent.
There seems to be little doubt that
the privilege will not be available
to allow a corporation to immunize
its records from disclosure by placing its papers and documents in the
hands of its lawyers for custodial
purposes. Nor is there any tendency
by the courts to extend the privilege
to business advice simply because
it is given by a lawyer.
TESTS OF APPLICABILITY

The cases provide some illuminating examples of the difficulty in
determining when the privilege
exists.
Communications to Corporate
Agents
An initial question sometimes
involves the issue of whether the
corporation is the client when information is communicated to a
lawyer by an agent of the corporation. In some cases, the agent may
be only a witness; in others he may
be speaking as the representative of
the corporation. What test should
be applied to determine whether
the communication is privileged as
to the corporation?
There have been suggestions that
the client is the corporation when-
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ever any agent originates a communication for the advice of company counsel on a matter concerning the interests of the corporation.
See Comment, The Lawyer-Client
Privilege: Its Application to Corporations, the Role of Ethics, and
Its Possible Curtailment, 56 Nw.
U.L. REv. 235, 242 (1961).
Other decisions would stop short
of all agents, but would clearly permit a fairly broad group to speak
for the corporation. See United
States v. United Shoe Machinery
Corp., above; Zenith Radio Corp.
v. Radio Corporation of America,
121 F. Supp. 792, 795 (D. Del.
1954). Others have suggested that
the test should be whether the
agent's communication related to
his corporate responsibilities. Burnham, Confidentiality and the Corporate Lawyer, 56 ILL. BAR J. 542
(1968).
On occasion it has been suggested
that the rank in the corporation of
the employee making the communication should be the determinant.
This contention was made in City
of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse
Electric Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483,
485 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
Several courts have formulated a
standard in terms of power to control. Garrison v. General Motors
Corp., 213 F. Supp. 515 (S.D. Cal.
1963); Day v. Illinois Power Co.,
50 Ill. App. 2d 52 199 N.E. 2d 802
(1964).
In City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., above,
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Judge Kirkpatrick stated the test in
these terms:
"Keeping in mind that the question is, Is it the corporation which
is seeking the lawyer's advice when
the asserted privileged communication is made?, the most satisfactory
solution, I think, is that if the employee making the communication,
of whatever rank he may be, is in
a position to control or even to take
a substantial part in a decision
about any action which the corporation may take upon the advice
of the attorney, or if he is an authorized member of a body or
group which has the authority,
then, in effect, he is (or personifies)
the corporation when he makes his
disclosure to the lawyer and the
privilege would apply. In all other
cases the employee would be merely
giving information to the lawyer
to enable the latter to advise those
in the corporation having the authority to act or refrain from acting
on the advice." 210 F. Supp. 483,
485 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
Thus, in a matter of overwhelming importance to a corporation,
a department or division head
might not be able to speak for the
corporation, while in cases where
an employee is actually authorized
to make a decision after consultation with counsel-as, for example,
the head of a claims department
dealing with a minor personal injury claim-a communication to an
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attorney concerning the matter
would be privileged as to the corporation. Id. at 486.
The statement of an agency outside the "control group" would
simply be that of a witness. The
corporation might still resist discovery on the "work product" concept of Hickman v. Taylor [329
U.S. 495 (1947)], but the statement
would not be privileged.
CONTROL

GRouP TEST

The "control group test" has been
vigorously criticized. See Burnham,
above, at 545-48; Heininger, The
Attorney-Client Privilege as It Relates to Corporations,53 ILL. BAR.

J. 376, 384 (1965).
It has been pointed out that the
adoption of such a test may mean
that outside counsel who engages
in internal investigations as a part
of a vigorous program of antitrust
compliance may be developing evidence against a client when he exchanges communications with corporate agents who are not within
the control group.
Furthermore, the test seems to
deny the privilege to the corporation when the communication is
made by middle-management executives who may not qualify for
inclusion in the control group, but
who have responsibilities for making recommendations that are frequently ratified perfunctorily by
higher management: See Maurer,
Privileged Communicationsand the
19
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Corporate Counsel, 28 ALA. LAW.
352, 367-69 (1967).
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Ice Co., 160 Misc. 658, 290 N.Y.
Supp. 483 (N.Y. Munic. Ct. 1936);
cf. Fey v. Staufler Chem. Co., 19
F.R.D. 526 (D. Neb. 1956).

Confidentiality
A second problem deals with the
requirements of confidentiality. A Nature of Advice
A third problem area involves the
communication that is not made in
confidence, as when an oral com- kind of advice that is sought or
munication is made in the presence given. The privilege applies only
of strangers or a written commu- when legal advice is sought from a
nication is distributed generally professional legal adviser who is
throughout a corporation, will not acting in that capacity.
be privileged.
Normally, there is no problem
A corporation must operate when the ordinary citizen consults
through agents and, therefore, some a lawyer. Frequently, however, lawagents of the corporations are nec- yers render commercial and even
essarily privy to any communica- technical advice to corporations in
tion with the attorney for the cor- addition to advice concerning the
poration. However, it does not fol- law.
low that a communication may be
Thus, it is sometimes necessary
disclosed indiscriminately within for the courts to characterize a comthe corporation and still be pro- munication as one seeking or protected.
viding business advice, and thus not
The best standard seems to recog- privileged, or one seeking legal adnige that disclosure may be made vice and, therefore, within the prowithin the corporation on a "need tection of the privilege. See United
to know" basis without destroying States v. Vehicular Parking, Ltd.,
the privilege. See Comment, 56 52 F. Supp. 751 (D. Del. 1943).
Nw. U.L. REv. 235, 248 (1961).
Frequently, however, the advice
It should, of course, be recog- of a lawyer may involve mixed
nized that a communication that legal-business advice. As Judge
was originally confidential, and thus Wysanski has pointed out:
privileged, may lose is status by
subsequently being broadcast to a
"The modern lawyer almost inlarger constituency. Indeed, it has variably advises his client upon not
been held that the privilege may be only what is permissible but also
lost by filing a document in the what is desirable. And it is in the
general files of the corporation. See public interest that the lawyei
United States v. Kelsey-Hayes should regard himself as more than
Wheel Co., 15 F.R.D. 461 (E.D. predicter of legal consequences. His
Mich. 1954); Cote v. Knickerbocker duty to society as well as to his
20
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client involves many relevant social,
economic, political, and philosophical considerations. And the privilege of nondisclosure is not lost
merely because relevant nonlegal
considerations are expressly stated
in a communication which also includes legal advice." United States
v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 89
F. Supp. 357, 359 (D. Mass. 1950).
If predominantly legal advice is
sought or given, the fact that business advice is also contained in the
communication should not affect
the privilege. But where a communication neither invited nor expressed any legal opinion, or where
the advice sought or given is
largely of a business nature, the
communication will not be protected. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corporation of America, 121 F.
Supp. 792, 794 (D. Del. 1954).
House Counsel
It has been suggested that the
privilege should not apply when
house counsel are involved. Wise
v. Western Union Telegraph Co.,
36 Del. (6 Harr.) 456, 178 A. 640
(1935).
An argument can be made for
the proposition that no incentive to
disclosure is needed when the attorney is himself an officer of the
corporation. However, it seems
probable that there would be much
greater reluctance in confiding in
house counsel if there were no
privilege. The need for frequent
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advice of counsel who is readily
accessible provides a cogent reason
for encouraging the use of house
counsel.
The fact that house counsel are
paid annual salaries, occupy the corporation's buildings, are employees
rather than independent contractors, and give advice to one regular
client rather than a number of
clients are not significant distinguishing characteristics insofar as
the availability of the privilege is
concerned. Consequently, the courts
have refused to deny categorically
the availability of the privilege to
the corporation-house counsel communication. See, e.g., United States
v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.,
above; Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio
Corporation of America, above;
American Cyanamid Co. v. Hercules Powder Co., 211 F. Supp. 85
(D. Del. 1962).
FUNCTION TEST

Whether the privilege applies to
a communication to or from house
counsel should depend primarily
upon the function performed by the
attorney in gathering or preparing
the material in question. The suggestion has been made that whether
a lawyer could receive a privileged
communication depends on the relative amount of time spent in the
role of attorney as compared to the
amount of time spent in business
affairs. American Cyanamid Co. v.
Hercules Powder Co., above.
A preferable approach would ex-
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amine the function he performed
with reference to each individual
communication, appreciating that a
lawyer who spends most of his time
giving business advice may be consulted on some matters solely for
legal assistance.
ADMINISTRATIVE

SAFEGUARDS

Several distinguished commentators have made some cogent suggestions of administrative techniques
to minimize the danger that the
privilege would not protect communication to and from house
counsel. Haight, Keeping the Privilege Inside the Corporation,18 Bus.
LAW. 551 (1963); Maurer, Privileged Communications and the Corporate Counsel, 28 ALA. LAW. 352,
385 (1967); Burnham, Confidentiality and the Corporate Lawyer, 56
ILL. BAR J. 542, 543-44 (1968); Heininger, The Attorney-Client Privilege
as It Relates to Corporations,53 ILL.
BAR J. 376, 383-84 (1965).
Their suggestions are consolidat-

ed into the following list:
* Place legal responsibility of the
corporation under one person. Patent counsel, tax counsel, claims
counsel, and others in organizational responsibility should be under the supervision of the chief
legal attorney.
" Use legal titles for legal personnel.
* Adopt special law department
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stationery, separate from company's
business stationery.
* Distinguish legal from business
advice and label legal advice by an
appropriate legend.
e Be careful of sequence. Channel
reports directly between the legal
department and the appropriate corporate executive-not indirectly.
* Segregate law department files
and office files. Confidential communications should not be maintained in general files.
* Communicate to as few persons
as possible. Corporate conferences
at which confidential communication or legal advice is sought should
be limited to necessary personnel
who have a high degree of responsibility for the subject matter.
o Where possible, each legal communication should be set up to deal
with a single legal problem, preferably with facts and business
problems set up and predicated for
legal conclusions.
o Beware of the copying machine.
Thomas Austern goes so far as to
recommend that the original be
marked "Legal Opinion-Not To
Be Copied-Return to Legal Division." Austern, Corporate Counsel
Communication: Is Anybody Listening? 17 Bus. LAW. 868, 871
(1962).
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* Adopt and enforce record retention schedules. Mr. Austern suggests the adoption of "an accelerated program of document dispositions." He suggests that the rule
should be that "in a documentary
garden, an annual is not a perennial." Ibid.
9 Where possible, have attorneys
admitted to local bar. Nonmembership has been held "highly probative" of the absence of the privilege. American Cyanamid Co. v.
Hercules Powder Co., 211 F. Supp.
85 (D. Del. 1962).
CHANGING ATTITUDES

These matters have not been the
subject of as extensive litigation
during the last few years as during
the 1962-1964 period. The problem
area has shifted to the issue discussed in the following section by
Mr. Brereton.
The problems alluded to above
cannot be answered by a formula.

There is the constant conflict between the policy that seeks to ascertain the truth and that which encourages the use of legal advice
through the device of the privilege.
The more deeply one is convinced
of the social necessity of permitting
corporations to consult frankly and
privately with legal advisers, the
more willing one should be to accord them a flexible and generous
privilege. Simon, The AttorneyClient Privilege as Applied to Corporations, 65 YALE L. J. 953, 990
(1956). The more convinced one
is that the privilege is being used
as a shield by the corporation to preclude access to the truth by immunizing vast quantities of relevant
evidence, the more restrictive will
be the interpretation given to the
privilege.
In the long run, a different attitude may be demonstrated in the
"private" cases involving routine
discovery than in the "public" cases
involving government regulation.
Only time will tell.

In these days of business ascendency, many large corporations
have their own staffs of "house counsel"; and the professional status
of the lawyer acquires fuzzy edges as he takes his place on the
company's payroll with other employees.
BERYL HAROLD LEvY, CORPORATION LAWYER:
SINNER?
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SAINT OR

9 (Chilton Co., Philadelphia, Pa. 1961).

